Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Semantics, Conceptual Role' and 'The Mysterious Flame'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]